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provide for the issuance of a search warrant of the person.20
Admittedly constitutions protect only against unreasonable search
and seizure,21 and the reasonableness of the search is determined from
the facts of each case.22 From this it may be strongly urged that the
search of an individual pursuant to a warrant commanding it is not
unreasonable and consequently not unconstitutional, if the facts justify
the issuance of the warrant. The answer to this argument is that such
search is historically and traditionally contrary to the policy of the
common law which vigorously protected the rights of the individual
citizen. Being contrary to public policy, such search is illegal, and
being illegal, it is unreasonable as a matter of law.
23
However, the legislature, in the exercise of its policy-making power,
may change that policy by statute and thereby authorize such search.
24
Wum A. RCcE
TAXATION: DISTRIBUTION IN KIND OF CORPORATE
ASSETS-UNITED STATES v. LYNCH
In United States v. Lynch' the taxpayer, one of several stockholders
in a closed corporation, received from the assets a dividend in kind
consisting of 21,977 boxes of apples. At the time of the distribution
the corporation had three stockholders and was in the business of grow-
ing and marketing fruits and vegetables. The dividend in apples was
declared at a stockholder's meeting on February 28, 1944, and ap-
proximately two months later they were sold pursuant to a pooling
'0 Collins v. Lean, supra note 16.
'People v. Preston, 341 Ii. 407, 173 N.E. 383 (1930).
" United States v. Thompson, 113 F. 2d 643 (7th Cir. 1940).
State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261 (1922).
Quaere: Does a court, also a policy-making body, have inherent power to
extend the law to permit a search of an individual under a search warrant in the
absence of a statute? That the early common law courts issued warrants to search
property in the exercise of inherent power is not disputed; that today such inherent
power remains in the courts is conceded. Further, it is conceded that the courts
have, and always have had, inherent power to issue warrants to search the person,
although they have not exercised it. Nevertheless, it is the writer's position that,
even though a court could today conceivably invoke its inherent power to issue
warrants to search the person not pursuant to statute, as a practical matter it
would not invoke such power, and for this reason: The courts, as dearly reflected
in the cases, deem it sound public policy to let the legislature govern the issuance
of search warrants to search the person, and consequently they would look to
statutes as governing the issuance of such warrants.
'192 F. 2d 718 (C.C.A. 9th 1951), certiorari denied 343 U. S. 934 (1952).
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agreement between the stockholders whereby the apples remained in
the corporation's warehouse up until the time of the sale and the
corporation acted as agent in making the sale. Then on April 29, 1944,
the corporation was liquidated. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
found that the excess of the sale price of the apples above cost was
taxable to the corporation as corporate income. The trial court 2 found
as matters of fact that the dividend was a true dividend taxable as in-
come to the stockholders and that the amounts received by the stock-
holders in sales of the assets distributed over and above the basis of
such assets to the corporation did not constitute income taxable to the
corporation. The Court of Appeals 3 for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
trial court and held that the profits from the sale were taxable to the
corporation on the theory that it was the same as if the corporation
had itself sold the assets at a gain. The appellate court stated that ap-
parenly the only motive for the dividend was to escape taxation and
further that it was not a distribution in kind under the statute4 and
must therefore be ignored for tax purposes. The circumstances that
the corporation gave the shareholders very favorable treatment by not
charging them a selling commission and that certain customary han-
dling charges were not imposed enabled the court to attribute the sale
to the corporation. The court concluded that since the corporation
continued to operate for a period of two months after declaration of
the dividend, it was not intended to be a liquidating dividend made
in winding up corporate affairs.
The case is illustrative of a fairly typical problem which arises when
a corporation has on its bands appreciated assets which it would
normally sell and pay a tax on the gain, either as ordinary income
or as a long term capital gain depending upon the nature of the assets.
In this situation if the corporation makes the sale and the resulting
profits are later passed on to the shareholders, they also must pay a
tax on their gain. One method of attempting to avoid this so-called
double taxation has been for the corporation not to sell the assets itself
but instead to distribute them in kind to the shareholders, thus com-
ing under the code provision5 which declares that there shall be no
tax to the corporation from the distribution in kind of its assets in
'USTC 51-1, Par. 9175 (D.C.E.D. Wash. 1950).
s Supra, note 1.
'26 U.S.C.A. sec. 115(a).
I "... No gain or loss is realized by a corporation from the mere distribution
of its assets in kind in partial or complete liquidation, however, they may have
appreciated or depreciated in value since their acquisition .. " U. S. Treas. Reg.
111, sec. 29.22 (a)-20 (1943). See Guant & Harris v. United States, 110 F. 2d
651 (C.C.A. 6th 1940); General Utilities and Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296
U. S. 200 (1935).
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partial or complete liquidation. The basic consideration in these cases
is whether the transaction will be recognized as a distribution in kind
to the shareholders and thus free of all tax to the corporation, or
whether on the other hand, the transaction will be looked through and
treated as in reality a sale by the corporation and, therefore, taxable
to the corporation.
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.6 is the leading case upholding
the tax on a corporation after an attempted distribution in kind to the
shareholders followed by a sale to a third party. In this case the
negotiations for sale to a third party had been entered into before the
corporation was actually dissolved and the Supreme Court treated the
entire transaction as if the sale had been effectuated by the corpora-
tion. The Court Holding Co. case was followed by several decisions
in which it was assumed that if the corporation holds title to the assets
at the time of commencement of negotiations and has not completed
the distribution of such assets prior to instituting the negotiations, the
gain on the scale must then be imputed to the corporation. 7 This
decision appeared to leave the law somewhat doubtful with regard to
the proper tests for determining when a sale should be attributed to
the corporation.
Thereafter arose the case of United States v. Cumberland Public
Service Co.8 wherein the Supreme Court granted certiorari to clear up
6324 U. S. 331 (1945), rev'g 143 F. 2d 828 (C.C.A. 5th 1944) rev'g 2 TO
531 (1943). Taxpayer, a Florida corporation had acquired an apartment building
at the time of its organization. A Mrs. Miller and her husband owned all of the
outstanding shares of stock. In 1939 the lessees of the building entered into
negotiations with the Millers for the purchase of the property. Later when the
parties met to execute a written contract of sale, the purchaser was advised that
the petitioner would not consummate the sale, since to do so would result in a
large tax. The very next day the corporate directors adopted a resolution for its
complete liquidation, and all property was conveyed to the two stockholders.
Several days later the sale to the same purchaser was agreed upon on the sameterms as had previously been decided. Similarly: Kafmann v. Commissioner, 175
F. 2d 28 (3rd Cir. 1949); Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 162 F. 2d 513 (C.C.A. 10th 1947). Earlier decisions to the
same effect: Fairfield S. S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F. 2ld 321 (C.C.A. 2d
1946), certiorari denied, 329 U. 5. 774 (1946); Embry Realty Co. v. Glenn, 116
F. 2d 682 (C.C.A. 6th 1940); James Duggan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
18 BTA 608 (1930).
' Kaufanun v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 175 F. 2d 28 (3rd Cir.
1949); Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 162.
F. 2d 513 (C.C.A. 10th 1947).8338 U. 5. 451 (1950), aff'g 83 F. Supp. 843 (1949). In this case the stock-
holders of an eleetric utility corporation had attempted to sell its stock to a co-operative, but was unsuccessful-because the cooperative did not want all of the
corporation's assets and the cooperative was doubtful as to whether it had legal
authorization to purchase the stock. Whereupon the stockholders delayed untilthey could ascertain the tax effects of such sales and finally decided to distribute
the assets in kind to themselves and then sell those assets to the cooperative. Thenthe remaining assets were to be sold by the c oration and the corporation dis-
solved. The Court of Claims held that the sale had actually been made by the
stockholders and thus no liability attached to the corporation for gain on the sale.
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uncertainty shown to have arisen in the aftermath of the Court Holding
Co. case. Here again, as in the Court Holding Co. decision, the sale
negotiations were entered into prior to any distribution and liquidation
of the corporation. This time, however, the Supreme Court held that
the sale actually had been made by the stockholders following the
distribution to them and therefore no gain was attributable to the
corporation. The Supreme Court laid down the following rules: 1)
Whether a liquidation distribution is genuine or a sham is a question
of fact for the trial court whose findings are to be accepted on appeal
if supported by the evidence. 9 2) Although a corporation is taxable
on the gain if it sells all its physical assets and immediately distributes
the cash, "sales of physical properties by shareholders following a
genuine liquidation distribution cannot be attributed to the corporation
for tax purposes"' 0 even though the motive for so arranging the sale
is tax avoidance.'1
Facts appearing in the Cumberland Public Service Co. case, thus
forming the basis of the limitations on the applicability of the Court
Holding Co. doctrine, are as follows:
1. All negotiations were complete and final and the agreement signed
before any step toward the liquidation of the corporation was taken.
2. The corporation continued to operate in order to dispose of the
remaining assets in its own name and was not immediately dissolved
after the sale.
3. All transactions leading to the sale were an admitted attempt at
tax avoidance.
4. The negotiations were conducted by officers of the corporation,
who were also the stockholders, in an attempt to dispose of the
properties of the corporation although the first offer was for the
sale of the stock.'
The Cumberland Public Service Co. case thus appears to have estab-
lished a more liberal foundation upon which the stockholders can
reasonably expect to be able to negotiate for a sale of corporate assets,
having been distributed in kind, without having the gain on the sale
for tax purposes imputed to the corporation under the Court Holding
Co. decision.
The court in the Lynch case emphasized that the corporation re-
mained a going concern and thus the distribution was not in contempla-
' Where there is supporting evidence the findings of the Tax Court must be
accepted. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489 (1943); Commissioner v. Scot-
tish American Investment Co., 323 U. S. 119 (1944); Commissioner v. Heininger,
820 U. S. 467 (1943). It should be noted that the problem stated in the Dobson
case still remains to some extent.
" 1 CCH 1953 Fed. Tax. Rep., par. 86.017.
" Ibid.
" 1 CCH 1953 Fed. Tax Rep., par. 86.
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tion of dissolution and liquidation within the meaning of the tax ex-
emption under section 115 of the Internal Revenue Code. It is assumed
that the lapse of two months after the date of the distribution and until
the liquidation was the factor which influenced the court to decide
that the corporation at the time of the distribution was a going con-
cern and intended to operate as such for a period of time thereafter.
This period of time seems scarcely to warrant the inference that the
corporation did not intend to liquidate but instead intended to con-
tinue to operate indefinitely. A more reasonable position would be to
allow the corporation a reasonable time after the distribution to wind
up its affairs and then look to the realities of the entire transaction in
order to determine whether it is a continuing business or not.
The motive to escape taxation appears also to have influenced the
decision in the principal case. The court, in arriving at the motive,
points to the favorable treatment granted by the corporation to the
shareholders in not charging a selling commission and not imposing
certain customary handling charges. Granting that the corporation
did intend to avoid the tax, this would not seem controlling in view
of the Cumberland Public Service Co. decision, wherein the Supreme
Court expressed itself very clearly in allowing this motive to exist
without holding the corporation responsible for the tax.'3 The trial
judge in the principal case followed the Cumberland view when he
asserted that the stockholders were not acting as a conduit and that
although the motive appeared to be tax avoidance the corporation
still was not to be charged with the tax. It is submitted that this view
is not unreasonable and is in line with previous decisions of the Su-
preme Court. The Court was explicit upon this point in Gregory v.
Helvering when it stated that "The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease
the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid
them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted."14 Suc-
cessful avoidance of the tax has been upheld on other occasions, for
example where the corporation had taken no part in the pre-liquidation
negotiations of the sale or the agreement (the sale in such an instance
being consummated after liquidation and the distribution of assets)' 5
In accord, United States v. Cummins Distilleries Corp., 166 F. 2d 17
(C.C.A. 6th 1948); Burley Tobacco Warehouse, Inc. v. Glenn, Collector of
Internal Revenue, 106 F. Supp. 949 (W. D. Ky. 1952); Herbert v. Riddell, 193
F. Supp. 369 (D.C.S.D. Cal.); Baum v. Dallman, 76 F. Supp. 410 (S.D. IlM. 1948);
Doyle Hosiery Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 TC 614 (1952)
' 293 U. S. 465 at p. 469.
' Howell Turpentine Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 819 (C.C.A. 5th 1947);
Baum v, Dallman 76 F. Supp. 410 (S.D. IlM. 1948).
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and again when there was a deferment of all negotiations until the
distribution in liquidation had been received.16
A more recent case which may give some indication of the present
trend is Burley Tobacco Warehouse, Inc. v. Glenn, Collector of Internal
Revenue' 7 where a corporation, composed of four stockholders who
were also the directors and officers, owned and operated a tobacco
warehouse. On April 15, 1946, some ten months after first considering
dissolution, the stockholders voted for the dissolution of the corpora-
tion and the distribution of its assets, including principally its ware-
house. However, approximately seven months previously the corpora-
tion had entered into negotiations for the sale of the warehouse.
Before the stockholders had voted for dissolution the purchaser had
completed negotiations and made out checks payable to the corpora-
tion which had been indorsed by the stockholders with the name of
the corporation struck out. The warehouse was sold on October 27,
1945, more than six months after the actual declared intention to dis-
solve and liquidate. The court, after careful consideration of these
facts, concluded that a sale by the corporation was not intended, and
that the corporation was not subject to the tax.'8
It will be noted that the time between the sale and suspension of
operation was six months in the Burley Tobacco Warehouse case, but
only two months in the Lynch case. Further in the Burley Tobacco
Warehouse case some of the checks in payment for the asset were
made out to the corporation, thus evidencing the understanding of the
purchaser that the sale was made by the corporation, while this factor
did not exist in the Lynch case. Finally, negotiations for the sale had
been conducted prior to the distribution in the instant case whereas
they were conducted after the distribution in the Lynch case. All of
these factors taken together more strongly indicate a sale by the
corporation in the Burley Tobacco Warehouse case than in the Lynch
case. Furthermore, the following facts, indicative of corporate motiva-
tion and non-existent in the Lynch case were present in the Burley
Tobacco Warehouse case: while negotiations for the sale were being
conducted title to the warehouse was in the corporation, but on the
other hand, no resolution was considered or adopted authoriziiig the
officers or anyone to act as agent for the corporation in the sale.19
" United States v. Cummins Distilleries Corp., 166 F. 2d 17 (C.C.A. 6th
1948); Ripy Bros. Distilleries, Inc., 11 TC 326 (1948).
11106 F. Supp. 949 (WN. D. Ky. 1952).
'In accord: Doyle Hosiery Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 TC 641 (1952);
Isadore A. Klaus, 11 TCM 357 (1952); Michael J. Shagan, 11 TCM 730 (1952).
. ' The court in the Burley Tobacco Warehouse case brings to our attention
the most recent interpretation by the Tax Court of the United States in the case
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It is submitted that the distribution in the Lynch case satisfactorily
meets the requirements for a distribution in kind on partial liquidation
of a corporation to be treated by the stockholders as in exchange for
the surrender of their stock within Section 115 (c) of the Internal
Revenue Code.20 That being so, the distribution itself should have no
tax consequences for the corporation as is expressly provided in the
regulations, and any subsequent sale of those same assets by the stock-
holders should be treated just the same as any other sale of assets by
the stockholders and not by the corporation. Therefore, as in the
normal case, the gain realized from such sale should be taxed to the
stockholders alone and not, in addition, to the corporation. This would
obviate the necessity for skillful arrangement of the facts in order to
determine the end results.
Basically there are three methods by which corporate assets are
transferred: 1) an outright sale by the corporation of its assets; 2) a
sale by the stockholders of their stockholdings (assuming the corpora-
tion is not involved); 8) or a dissolution and liquidation of the corpora-
tion and a subsequent sale of the assets received on dissolution by the
stockholders. 21 Ordinarily it devolves upon the purchaser and the
corporation as to which method of transfer will be used. The pur-
chaser may have certain reasons for not desiring to make an outright
purchase of the corporate stock in order to obtain the assets.22 Tax-
wise it makes considerable difference to the corporation which method
is to be used to accomplish the transfer, especially in small closed
corporations usually subject to this type of litigation. In an attempt to
solve the problem with certainty the following solutions have been
offered: 1) elimination of the tax on any sale in liquidation even if
made by the corporation itself; 2) imposition of a corporate tax on
of Doyle Hosiery Corporation v. Commissioner, 17 TC 641 (1952), wherein a sale
of corporate assets was being considered along with a sale of the corporate stock
by the stockholders prior to any liquidation and the sale was made by the stock-
holders. The Tax Court held that the Cumberland Public Service Co. case con-
trolled.
"Distributions in Liquidation. Amounts distributed in complete liquidation
of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock, and
amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in
part or full payment in exchange for the stock. The gain or loss to the distributee
resulting from such exchange shall be determined under section 111, but shall be
recognized only to the extent provided in section 112. In the case of amounts dis-
tributed . . in partial liquidation ... the part of such distribution which is
properly chargeable to capital account shall not be considered a distribution of
earnings or profits.."
Gutfn and Beck, Sale of Assets Received on Liquidation 28 TAXEs 328
(1950).
2 2 Magill, Sales of Corporate Stock or Assets, 47 CoLUMIA L. Rzv. 707
(1947). Such reasons could consist of the factor of unknown or hidden liabilities
and the transferee becoming liable for the tax.
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any device used for transferring the assets, or any part thereof, to one
not entitled to receive them in liquidation, and by transferring the
purchase money to the shareholders so entitled; 8) taxation of any
transfer within an arbitrary time limit of assets to one not entitled to
receive them in liquidation; or 4) legislative repeal or judicial over-
ruling of the doctrine that a distribution in kind is tax-free to the
corporation.
23
In conclusion, it is believed that the decision in the Lynch case
places an unnecessary burden on the corporation to liquidate im-
mediately and to show that the sale of the assets was in fact made by
the stockholders and not through the offices of the corporation. In
spite of authority to the contrary it appears that tax avoidance is still
to be reckoned with when an attempt is made to sell the assets of the
corporation. Therefore, one can only conclude that, at least in the
Ninth Circuit, some of the clouds created by the Court Holding Co.
decision still remain.
JAims F. HoGE
EQUITY-CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-
PARTIAL ENFORCEMENT-CERESIA V. MITCHELL
Although contracts in total restraint of trade are void as against
public policy those in partial restraint only, under certain circum-
stances, will be enforced. In determining whether or not to enforce
a contract admittedly in partial restraint only, the courts have de-
veloped certain criteria as to the reasonableness of the restraint. These
include an examination of the subject matter, the nature of the business,
the situation of the parties and the circumstances of the particular
case. Covenants not to engage in a certain occupation or business
must not be wider than reasonably required for the protection of the
business and good will of the promisee, i.e., the employer or vendee.1
However, if the restriction affords unusually wide protection to the
interests of the promisee but does not interfere with the public interest
or impose an undue hardship on the promisor it normally will be en-
forced,2 even though, for example, the restriction extends to an entire
'Note, 63 HAv. L. Bxzv. 484, 493-4 (1950).
'Thomas W. Briggs Co. v. Mason, 217 Ky. 269, 289 S.W. 295 (1926); Owl
Laundry Co. v. Banks, 83 N. J. Eq. 230, 89 AtI. 1055 (1914).
217 CJ.S. 630-632 (1939).
